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Investing through Insanity
”There
is no salvation in becoming adapted to a world which is crazy.”
Henry Miller(1891
- 1980),
"The Colossus of Maroussi" (1941)
Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.
If we stand back and take a good look at the financial system and the main institutions
involved, fairly soon you will find your head spinning with the majestic wonder
of the whole construct. As glorious as it is, the real miracle is that it holds
together at all, but somehow it manages to work, or at least it has until recently.
Any human construction will, of course have its imperfections. Taken to the limit
these fault lines can become critical, and this is where we find ourselves. The
structure and mechanics of the financial markets has now become a major issue, perhaps
the major issue. Let’s take as short a route as we can through the financial system
to describe the enormous tensions that have only just begun to be exposed.
The first thing we can see is that everything is leveraged. Bear Stearns was leveraged
37 to one when it went bankrupt. What this means is that a 3% adverse move in its
assets would more than wipe out its entire equity capital. It does not take that
much to make a company like this bankrupt. However, just because Bear Stearns has
now dissolved don’t rush to the conclusion that all is now well. The other largest
investment banks have similar levels of leverage, ranging from 32 to 45 times.
Compounding the problem is that these enormous risks are not even managed very well.
I was a Managing Director on the proprietary trading desk at J.P.Morgan in London,
and had first hand experience of this, but why not just consider the remarks made
recently by the most succesfull investors on the planet. Warren Buffett and Charlie
Munger run Berkshire Hathaway, the most succesful investment company there is:
Buffett on investment banks: "For the most part, investment bank CEOs cannot fully manage their balance sheet risks." Munger on investment banks: "It was crazy to allow the investment banks to get too big to fail. It was demented to have allowed trading activity to get so out of control. In the process of cleaning up Salomon Brothers' balance sheet, we had $250 million in 'good until reached for' assets. The accounting industry utterly failed us." Munger on Wall Street's mentality that risk can be precisely quantified: "The job role of a chief risk officer at a Wall Street firm: the guy who makes you feel good while you're doing something dumb."
Of course, leverage and poor management does not stop just there. It is pervasive.
Hedge funds often leverage up to extraordinary
levels, commercial banks are at least 10 times leveraged, and even Fannie Mae, with
its imputed government backing was 30 times leveraged before the crisis. Now in
response to the crisis, the government needed to act, so of course it decided to
increase the leverage of Fannie Mae to 33 times. I’m sure that more leverage is
just what we need!
While we are on the subject of solving excessive leverage, with, guess what, more
leverage, let’s turn to genius of the Federal Reserve. Remember that this institution
talks all the time about providing stability, both to the economy and the markets.
Is that really true? Is it heresy to suggest that in fact the Federal Reserve could
actually be the cause of all this instability?
The Tragic
Federal Reserve
“A truth’s initial commotion is directly proportional
to how deeply the lie was believed. It wasn’t the world being round that agitated
people, but that the world wasn’t flat. When a well packaged web of lies has been
sold gradually to the masses over generations, the truth will seem utterly preposterous
and its speaker a raving lunatic”.
Dresden
James, Author.
The Federal Reserve has decided that for the first time in living memory to open
its balance sheet to leveraged investment banks. Apparently, if there is a financial
crisis with over leveraged businesses, it’s clear to the Fed that the remedy is
capital support to hold up their levels of leverage. How much capital will be extended?
We don’t know. What collateral will investment banks provide? We don’t know, although
the types of loan acceptable to the Fed seems to be broadening at a rapid rate.
Given that the Fed is now handing over the “people’s money” what restrictions and
regulations will be imposed on the investment banks? We don’t know.
Even if the Fed would like to return to some fiscally conservative policy, that
does not appear to be a realistic option today. Instead, the Fed hopes to be expedient
today, avoiding economic collapse, and perhaps return to being virtuous at some
point in the future. The problem is, you can’t get there from here, as the local
yokel said when asked for directions!
The extraordinary actions taken by the Bernanke Federal Reserve reflect acts of
desperation rather than long-term policy solutions. Somehow keeping the system intact
is the clear priority, rather than getting round to fixing the now glaring errors
of the recent past.
The tragedy is that this short term expediency merely compounds the errors of the
past. Beyond any short term relief, in the longer term the current solutions are
simply making the overall system even worse.
The key is to understand how we got here in the first place. Really it is a simple
matter. Like an over indulgent parent, who always provides candy to their children
when anything seems to go wrong, the Fed has become increasingly over supportive
of the financial markets, and the economy with its monetary interventions. At some
stage the child becomes cronically overweight and unfit, and at risk of diabetes.
In the same way people have come to believe that the US economy will always be strong,
as another injection of the sugar of cheap and plentiful money, can solve any short
term adversity.
While the Fed’s interventions provide a short term boost, if overused they start
to change behaviour. Without natural economic conditions, the natural rules of self-discipline
seem unnecessary and even penalized. Increasingly, enormous risks can be taken with
balance sheets, as leverage is more highly rewardly, or at least punished less severely.
The consequences are easy to understand:
1.
The savings rate in the US has collapsed over the years.
2.
The growth of hedge funds has been exponential in recent years.
3.
The growth of derivatives has been exponential in recent years.
4.
The levels of leverage of commercial and investment banks in general is clearly
excessive.
5.
Standards of lending fall. For example, NINJA (No Income No Job or Assets) loans
became commonplace.
In short, over time, there was apparently no restrictions imposed by regulators
on poor standards, or excessive lending. Market participants have been left to find
their own limits, which are higher than natural levels as they can operate in the
knowledge that the Fed, and the government, will backstop the overall market in
the way that it now has, and in the mean time bad behaviour seems to generate enormous
benefits. Whether an over abundance of consumer goods in the personal sector or
enormous bonuses in the corporate sector, which are kept almost regardless of the
longer term outcome.
What happened in the
mortgage market in recent years serves as a great example of the current insanity
that somehow became the norm at least for a time. Here is description written by
Porter Stansberry of Stansberry and Associates:
“Who in his right mind would make a loan to
someone with hardly any down payment or any proof he could repay it? And what kind
of a bank advertises its underwriting as "Fast and Easy"? The kind of bank that
can turn around and immediately sell its liar loans at a profit to a ready and willing
agency of the federal government - Fannie Mae. Fannie bought these "prime" loans
eagerly during 2003-2006, with full knowledge of the underwriting. But now, Fannie
is calling Countrywide's actions fraudulent because "Fast and Easy" loans are 50%
more likely to default than documented loans. Congressman Barney Frank's idea to
"solve" the mortgage crisis is to let Fannie buy even more mortgages...
The actions of all the parties in this fiasco
strains credulity. It's surprisingly difficult to figure out who was more greedy
and stupid, the lenders, the borrowers, or the mortgage agencies (Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac). And liar loans weren't even the most preposterous mortgages. Many
loans were made to borrowers who could positively not afford the debt service. For
these buyers, who were known
not to be able to afford their mortgages, a new type of mortgage was created, an
"option" adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). The "option" was to pay or not to pay your
monthly interest and principal obligation. If you chose not to pay your mortgage,
the interest you did not pay would be added onto your existing mortgage, up until
you owed 125% of the value of your home, at which point you would have to begin
making a vastly higher monthly payment.
It won't surprise you
to learn that folks who don't pay their mortgages usually can't
pay their mortgages. And a growing mortgage balance doesn't make them
any more likely to pay or be able to pay. In fact, owing far more than a home is
worth makes it vastly more likely for a mortgage to go into default. Nevertheless,
roughly 50% of Washington Mutual's "prime" mortgage portfolio is made up of option
ARMs. So far, about 10% of these loans have gone bad. Far more will spoil when payments
actually become due in 2009 and 2010. Keep these facts in mind when you hear the
government talking about the good people who are "losing their homes" to ARM resets.
When it comes to option ARMs, the people never actually owned anything, except a
mortgage they clearly couldn't afford. These are the folks our government now wants
to bail out. It's a new kind of socialism: stupidism.”
People need to start asking questions about how such an absurd system could ever
come about. Perhaps ask even deeper questions about the whole structure of the financial
system. For example, what exactly is the Federal Reserve? And if they are doing
such a great job, how could all this absurd nonsense be happening?
Only then will it become more apparent that our current financial problems are deeply
imbedded in the institutions that make up the financial system and their behavior.
These institutions have become essentially the cause of the instability, not the
cure.
Fire and Ice
There is no getting around the dilemma we are facing at the current time. The “crazy”
structure of the financial world has only just begun to unravel. It took decades
to develop, so it is absurd to believe that it can be resolved in a few months.
We are now confronted with two powerful forces that will be struggling for dominance
over the next few years. These forces are best described as fire and ice.
Returning to our analogy above, there comes a time when even the child realizes
that the last thing he needs is more candy. Confronted with ever deteriorating health
a new regime has to be implemented. The candy is turned away and healthy living
habits become a necessity.
Financially, the system remains absurdly overleveraged, with far more derivatives
than could possibly make any sense (with a total nominal aggregate value of 8 times
world Economic activity or GDP), and still an unknown quantity of right offs yet
to come. With a lack of confidence and unknown balance sheet risks there is a substantial
risk that the markets just freeze up, as participants shy away from risks that they
are now unwilling to take, and this occurs at a time when deleveraging becomes a
survival necessity.
The overall impact of this dramatic change in behaviour, however, is that the natural
and normal flow of credit, becomes overwhelmed by deleveraging. The deleveraging
has to take place over time to restore natural stability, but given the extreme
degree and scale of the leverage, there is clearly a non-trivial risk of the credit
flow turning to ice.
The Fed knows that this is the risk that it wants avoid at all cost, as it would
cause enormous damage not just to market participants, but most likely also to the
economy more widely. Also the Fed has becomed conditioned to believe that its role
is to support the markets and the economy, even if in this case it now sees it role
more as a savior with extreme measures, rather than merely as a constant supporter.
However, the Fed has only a few tools with which to fight the ice. More leverage,
more credit and capital, and lower interest rates. Essentially more money which
they can create at will in a fiat currency system. This is the fire that is the
Fed’s only strategy. The risk with this strategy is that if used excessively it
will light the fires of inflation.
To believe this is the solution is to believe that when the doctor detects that the child has diabetes, the doctor is right to prescribe higher doses of candy.
Summary
“Predictions are rarely wise, and it is usually
wise not to make predictions”
In a fire and ice world the forces at play are opposite and extreme. On the one
hand deleveraging simply has to take place to restore the natural flow of credit
and risk taking. Yet, on the other hand, this could get out of hand if it happens
too quickly.
The Fed’s remedy of extreme measures sets a very dangerous precedent in accelerating
the measures and intensity with which monetary support can be injected into the
financial system. Although this can provide short term relief, these actions are
simply an acceleration of the interventions that got us into so much trouble in
the first place.
Making predictions in this environment is more than usually hazardous. Investors
simply need greater awareness of the situation, and more extensive stress testing
of their portfolio, as well as clear rules for the risk management of their assets,
as instability becomes a greater risk.
The key change is that now the financial structure itself has become a major issue.
I will not pretend to know the timescale over which this situation will unfold,
but the historical precedent is clear. Fiat money and central banking has never
worked well in the long term. There was a good reason why the constitution tried
to make it illegal.
Chris Belchamber Investment Management, LLC
301-767-0336 (phone/fax) www.ChrisBelchamber.com
Notice
All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to
its accuracy. Investment recommendations may change and readers are urged to check
with their investment counselors before making any investment decisions.
Opinions expressed in these reports may change without prior notice. Chris Belchamber
(the author) may or may not have investments or positions in any assets or derivatives
cited above. Communications from the author are intended solely for informational purposes. Statements made by various authors, advertisers, sponsors, and other contributors do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the author, and should not be construed as an endorsement by the author, either expressed or implied. The author is not responsible for typographic errors or other inaccuracies in the content. We believe the information contained herein to be accurate and reliable. However, errors may occasionally occur. Therefore, all information and materials are provided "AS IS" without any warranty of any kind. Past results are not indicative of future results. |
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